IN DEPTH

Carter throws peanuts to cities

By Marc A. Weiss and Erica Schoenberger

Last November, just after the demis of the main elements of President Carter's urban legislative package, Presidential adviser Anne Wexler commented, "There has been no diminution in our commit ment. We're just looking for a new strat egy to get it introduced and passed." Nov that President Carter has announced his proposed budget for 1980, the "new urban strategy is, peanuts for the cities

In order to pave the way for an \$11 billion increase in defense spending, Car ter has wielded a heavy axe on a wide variety of urban aid programs and other so cial services that benefit low and moderate income people and minorities

CETA jobs, already slashed last year by 100,000 are due for further cuts of proposals. New York City alone will be forced to lay off 7000 CETA employees.

A separate program, the summer job for youth, which is particularly needed in urban ghettoes, is being pared back by a whopping 25 percent. Carter's solu tion: 14-year-olds will lose eligibility

Public housing and subsidized rental assistance for low and moderate incom families is slated to be cut by nearly 10 percent, although low-interest housing rehabilitation loans in newly chic inner city neighborhoods will be increased. Since est of these loans go to higher-incom individuals, this seems to be a clear case of adding insult to injury.

Urban League president Vernon Jordan argues that Carter's austerity policy combined with an already intolerable unemployment rate is pushing black Americans to "the brink of disast

A friend in the White House?

The drastic cutbacks in federal urban as sistance are all the more striking given Carter's pledge just last spring that cities of our country have a friend, an ally and a partner in the White House." This pledge was the capstone of the President's announcement of a "comprehensive na-tional urban policy," March 23, 1978. promising an extra \$5 billion in new city programs and a reordering of federal urban priorities. Most urban leaders are now puzzling over the precise where abouts of their friendly partner.

two years after making a campaign promise in July 1976 to focus federal at-tention on solving urban problems if elected President. By July 1977, many of the voters who helped put Carter into office on the basis of this and similar pledger were angry at the White House's lack of responsiveness. Vernon Jordan made a critical speech that galvanized the adm istration into action. A flurry of Cabinet level meetings and federal task forces resulted in the set of proposals the Presiunveiled with considerable fanfare

The substance of the proposed urban policy fell roughly into four categories. First, President Carter promised more interagency coordination and a new pro-cess called "Urban Impact Analysis" whereby the federal government would try to consider the specifically urban impacts of any new programs or policies The purpose of this process is to avoid a repetition of the disastrous impact FHA mortgage insurance, interstate highway funding, federal energy plicies and other "non-urban" programs have central cities in the past 30 years programs have had on

A second element of the proposed strat-egy was to increase the "targeting" of federal spending whereby urban-oriented programs would concentrate on the "most distressed" cities, neighborhoods and people. Targeted efforts were to include the location of federal facilities, federal procurement policy, fiscal assistance to city treasuries, public works funding, and public service jobs programs. The third idea stressed in Carter's ap-

proach was the notion of "leveraging a modest amount of federal dollars to induce a greater commitment of private recities. The bulk of this program con ed of large subsidies to business in the form of tax credits, loans, loan guarantees, and grants. In addition, smaller sums were promised to neighborhood and self-help groups to help finance ho ne rehabilitation and other projects.

Do not pass Go ...

The high point of all this hoopla cam last August when Carter signed Executive Orders implementing the Urban Impact Analysis, the interagency review cess, and the targeting of federal facili and procurement. On the Congre sional front, however, things were considerably bleaker. Almost all of the legisla e proposals were on their way to defeat. All of the administration's "highest pri urban programs, including public works, supplemental fiscal aid and cou tercyclical revenue sharing, and incentigrants to states, ran aground on Capi Hill, Public service jobs also sank, as did the National Development Bank. The only major initiatives to clear Congress were an syment tax credit and the extensi of the investment tax credit to rehabilitat ed structures. These two business subsidies were passed only after they shed their

markedly pro-business 1978 Tax Bill. One reason for the failure of this I package of legislation is the lack of any significant backing by the Carter administration. It seems that President Carter was tent to fulfill his campaign pledge promulgate an urban policy and equally ontent to see that policy fail. One Conional staffer characterized the adn stration's disorganized and unenthusiastic lobbying effort as "a bunch of second tier Treasury people ra-tap-tapping on every-body's door." The only hard lobbying for some of the proposals was done by the ursencies themselves.

arban image and were "folded into" the

The Great Leap Backward.

The much-heralded national urban policy has left behind scant traces of glory. Of the four Executive Orders, the interagency review process is clearly meaningless, and he targeting of federal facilities and pro curement has thus far been honored more in the breach than the observance. Federal agencies and the scandal-ridden General Services Administration are already in a fit of utter confusion over the pre-vious Presidential mandates to target their visous Presidential mandates to dege toke activities to high-unemployment rural areas, women and minorities, veterans, handicapped individuals, and a host of other people and places. Urban Impact Analysis (UIA) remains

the most promising of the Executive Or ders, but it too is fraught with problems To begin with, unlike Environmental Im pact Statements, UIAs are not legally binding. Secondly, UIAs only apply to new federal initiatives, not existing pro-grams or policies. Thirdly, each agency decides which initiatives it wants to an-

alvze and performs the analysis on itself And finally, the ideology of UIAs shift the terms of debate by blaming the federal government for urban ills, rather than the private sector, which certainly must bear its share of the responsibility. Private corporations should also be re-

Of last year's tattered legislative package, the sole born-again administration ative for 1980 is Carter's prop for a National Development Bank. This controversial measure has the virtue in Carter's eyes of being as big a boondoggle for the business community as last year's Tax Bill. By limiting the Bank's subsidies to only the most credit-worthy clients, Carter is ensuring that the primary recipients of this federal beneficence will be large corporations that are least in need of accistance

Whether any new jobs will be created by this approach is highly doubtful, since veral detailed studies by Professors Ben nett Harrison and Sandra Kanter in Bos ton and Roger Vaughn of the RAND Corporation have convincingly demonstrated virtually no effect on corporate decisions and merely reward them for doing what they would have done anyway. Smaller, high-risk companies or community-base and cooperative enterprises that could significantly benefit from federal capital subsidies, will not be eligible for Nation al Development Bank loans.

The notion that the National Develo nt Bank could generate even the slightest bit of excitement among urban groups was quickly squelched in November when the National League of Cities refused to endorse the measure after President Car-ter actively solicited their support.

Since none of the other major initia-

ves is even being contemplated by the dministration, at this point the "na al urban policy" is just about dead. The

New York Times recently quoted Richard Nathan of the Brookings Institution as saving, "The heyday of urban policy may turn out to have been the period just be fore the announcement of the Carter up ban program."

Obstacles and opportunities,

Part of the reason for the difficulties that the urban efforts encountered in Congress last year is that the constituence groups themselves are divided as to how to proceed. Representatives of declining eastern and Midwestern cit pushed for targeting spending on the basis of slow growth rates in jobs and population, while southern urban lobbies are more concerned about targeting to cities with large numbers of low income peo ple. In other words, each side in the ur-ban wing of the "Frostbelt-Sunbelt" controversy wants more for itself and is has the votes and Carter gets off scot-free with promises but no programs.

Even if the warring regional con Even it the warring regional congres-sional delegations had united and Car-ter's entire program had passed, however, the most serious city problems would still have persisted. The unequal distribution of income, wealth and power, racial and sexual discrimination, and the unbridle dominance of large corporations on all our lives will not disappear with increase countercyclical revenue sharing. Continued efforts at organizing on the

local level aimed at creating viable alterative economic institutions and attain ing political power are necessary steps to ensure that the next national urban pol-icy is more than just a big smile from the

scy is more than just a big smile from the White House.

Mare A. Weiss is professor of city and re-gional planning, University of California, Berkeley. He and Erica Shoenberger are members of the National Urban Policy Collective, which participated in prepar-